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exceed the revenue the government extracts from the shareholders. It is questionable whether there is a net advantage to the people of this country in a
system of taxation which requires such highly technical and specialized skills to
compute tax liability. If the ultimate purpose of Subpart F is only to require
United States shareholders to pay a fair tax on passive or manipulated income
of corporations they control, perhaps our government could be satisfied with a
less precise but simpler method, such as a flat excise on certain transactions.
As an alternative, the Congress should give careful consideration to eliminating the deferral privilege. There is considerable merit in the argument that an
income tax which is imposed only on net profit does not effect the ability of an
enterprise to compete or to earn that profit. It only reduces the amount of income available for distribution or reinvestment. Hence, the impact of an income
tax is on the ability of an enterprise to attract and retain capital. Because an
income tax reduces profitability, ending the deferral privilege would tend to
equalize the advantages of domestic and foreign investment. It seems only fair
that income produced by American capital should bear an equal tax burden
regardless of the location of that capital. If this is the correct view, it is hard to
see an economic justification for continuing the deferral privilege. Subpart F
could be abolished and replaced by a simpler and more inclusive system of taxation.
CHRISTOPHER VON GAL

FEDERAL TAXATION: SECTION 2518 DISCLAIMERSANYTHING BUT UNIFORM
INTRODUrION

May the recipient of a gratuitous transfer simply reject it and be treated
for federal tax purposes as having never received the rejected interest? And
will the recipient's refusal cause the transferor to be treated as having never
made the transfer? If the recipient makes a valid federal disclaimer, the answer
to both questions is clearly affirmative.
The need for reform of the federal estate and gift tax treatment of disclaimer was universally recognized prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976.1
Commentators 2 as well as professional study groups 3 undertaking the question
agreed that a definitive, therefore uniform, disclaimer statute was necessary.
1. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520, 1976-3 C.B. 1.
2. E.g., Newman & Kalter, The Need for Disclaimer Legislation-An Analysis of the
Background and Current Law, 28 TAx LAw. 571 (1975).
3. See H.R. REp. No. 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 n.5, 1976-3 C.B. 800 n.5, in which
the Conference Committee declared: "Your committee notes that many professional study
groups have recommended that definitive rules be provided with respect to the treatment of
disclaimers for estate and gift tax purposes. See American Bar Association recommendation
number 1974-2. 27 Tax Law. 818 (1974); American Law Institute recommendations 21 and 22.
Federal Estate and Gift Taxation: Recommendations Adopted by the American Law Institute," pp. 39-41 (1968); Tax Reform Studies and Proposals: U.S. Treasury Department, p. 387
(1969); American Bankers Association, Commentary on Proposed Tax Reform Affecting
claimer prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976.
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Such a statute would eliminate the disparate results caused by deference to
local law in determining the validity of a particular disclaimer for federal tax
purposes.'
With the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 5 Congress sought to remedy this lack of
equality by enacting section 25186 to define federal disclaimers. The House of
Representatives Ways and Means Committee declared the need for definitive
disclaimer rules with uniform results to be the reason for passage of section
2518. 7 Additionally, the committee was particularly concerned with the lack of
a uniform time standard for disclaimers., Unfortunately, however, section 2518
does not provide uniformity.
A "qualified disclaimer" is defined generally by the new statute as "an
9
irrevocable and unqualified refusal . .. to accept an interest in property."

Among the specific requirements for a qualified disclaimer is that the disclaimed interest pass without direction of the disclaimanto to a person other
than the disclaimant or the decedent's spouse.11 Herein lies the fundamental
failing of section 2518. Passage of interest is a question spoken to by local
rather than federal law.12 Thus, Congress has failed to create a uniform law for
federal disclaimers. Federal disclaimers continue to be subservient to the
nuances of local law; if a disclaimer is not effective under local law, no interest
the disclaimant, and the disclaimer is therefore
passes without direction of 18
ineffective under federal law.
4. Compare William L. Maxwell, 17 T.C. 1589 (1952), in which the court applied Minnesota common law in holding that intestate shares could not be disclaimed because they
passed, not at the direction of the decedent, but by operation of law, with present MiNN. STAT.
§525.532 (1976), which provides for the renunciation of intestate shares, thereby changing the
impact of federal estate and gift taxes on Minnesota residents. See Appendix A infra.
5. The Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, §§2006(a), 2006(c), 2009(b), 2009(e)(2),
90 Stat. 1520, 1887, 1889, 1893, 1896, 1976-3 C.B. 363, 365, 369, 372.
6. I.R.C. §2518. This section sets forth the substantive rules for disclaiming interests for
purposes of the federal gift tax found in chapter 12; however, it also applies for chapter 11
estate tax purposes, I.R.C. §2045, and chapter 13 generation-skipping transfer tax purposes,

I.R.C. §2614(c).
7. H.R. REP. No. 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, 1976-3 C.B. 800.
8. Id.

9. LR.C. §2518(b).
10. The federal statute, I.R.C. §2518, does not label the disclaiming party the "disclaimant." Instead, the disclaimant is referred to as "the party making the disclaimer." Aside from
the congressional habit of never saying in one word what can be said in five, there does not
seem to be any reason for the rather bulky label. Throughout this article "the person making
sFEas
the disclaimer" will be referred to as the disclamant. See UNiFOM DISCLAIMER or T
BYN WILL, INTESrACY OR APPomNTMNT Acr §§1-10 (1973) (hereinafter cited as UDTA), which
utilizes the "disclaimant" label. But see UNonF PROBATE CODE §2-801 (hereinafter cited as
UPC), which adopts the UDTA as the amended UPC but does not utilize the "disclaimant"
label.

11. I.R.C. §2518(b)(4).
12. See Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.. 103 (1932), in which the Court declared that "[s]tate
law may control only when the federal taxing act by express language or necessary implica-

tion, makes its own operation dependent upon state law." Id. at 110.
13. Compare I.R.C. §2818(b)(4) with TREAs. REG. §§25.2511-1(c), 25.2514-3(c)(5), 20.2056
(d)-(l) (1958), which expressly deferred to state law as one of the tests for a valid federal disEstates and Trusts, p. 166 of appendix A (1973)."
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Similarly, the specific timing provision of section 2518 does not create uniformity. It provides that a qualified disclaimer must be made within nine
months after the transfer creating the interest. 14 Yet where local law provides
a shorter time limit, no interest can pass after that time limit expires without
direction of the disclaimant. 5 Clearly, the time for exercise of a valid federal
disclaimer will vary depending on the applicable local law since at least
twenty-four states provide for shorter disclaimer periods than the federal nine
month limit.' 6 Even more disturbing than its lack of uniformity is the harsh,
mechanical nature of the timing provision found in section 2518. Because of
its arbitrary nine month limit, section 2518 may eliminate a beneficiary's right
to disclaim an interest even before he knows that the interest exists.-l
It is the contention of this article that the inequality caused by deference to
local law as well as the harsh nine month time limit are unnecessary defects in
the present disclaimer legislation. Uniform results can be achieved in a manner
similar to that proposed in 1975 by the American Bar Association Section on
Taxation.' 8 Where a disclaimer is effective under federal rules but not under
local rules, it could still be an effective federal disclaimer if the interest transferred at the disclaimant's direction were transferred to the person who would
have received the interest had the disclaimer been effective under local law.The harsh timing standard can be ameliorated by a presumptive nine
month limit following the transfer creating the interest to be disclaimed. Only
upon presentation of clear and convincing evidence that he had not learned of
the transfer until a later date could the disclaimant overcome the presumptive
limit. Upon such proof, the time for effective disclaimers would be extended to
six months following the date on which the disclaimant learned of the transfer.20 Such a timing standard would combine the flexibility of the pre-1977
reasonable time standard with the administrative convenience of the current
legislation. While a disclaimant who had never been informed of his interest
14. I.R.C. §2518(b)(2)(A).
15. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §30.1-10-01 (West 1976 Supp.), which provides that an
instrument renouncing a present interest "must be filed within six months after the death of
the decedent or the donee of the power." (Emphasis added).
16. See Appendix D infra.
17. See R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND, FEDERAL ESTATE AND Gu-r TAXATION 110.10
(2)(d) (4th ed. 1978) (hereinafter cited as R. STE'HENS), in which the following hypothetical
was posed: "T creates an irrevocable inter vivos trust naming specific beneficiaries but giving
D a general power of appointment over the remainder. If D is not informed of the existence
of the power until a year after its creation he is unable to make a 'qualified disclaimer' under
Section 2518, even though he attempts to do so immediately upon learning of the existence of
the power."
18. See Committee on Estate and Gift Taxes, Legislative Recommendation No. 2, 27
TAx LAW. 818-25 (1974).
19. The ABA suggestion would require that the interest pass as though the disclaimant
had predeceased the prior holder of the property. See notes 99-102 infra and accompanying
text explaining why the suggested amendment alters the ABA passage requirement.
20. Cf. CAL. PROB. CODE §190.3 (West 1972) (see Appendix D, n.14 infra); DE.. CODE
ANN. cit. 12 §512(b) (1975) (see Appendix D, n.19 infra); FLA. STAT. §732.801(5) (1977) (see
Appendix D, n.21 infra); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 191A §3 (West 1974) (see Appendix D,
nA0 infra); 1977 N.Y. LAws ch. 861 §2-1.11(b) (see Appendix D, n.60 infra); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§852.13 (West 1978 Supp.) (see Appendix D, n.86 infra).
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would not be deprived of his right to disclaim that interest, an executor could
limit the period of uncertainty by simply notifying all the transferees of their
21
respective interests.
DIscLAImRs IN GENERAL

Disclaimers or renunciations 22 of gratuitous transfers are made by the
beneficiaries of those transfers.2 3 By effectively disclaiming an interest in property, a beneficiary can significantly alter the federal estate, gift, and generationskipping tax consequences of such transfers. 2- Once an interest is disclaimed,
25
the transfer creating the interest is treated as if it had never occurred.
For example, assume that T died in 1974 leaving his $60,000 adjusted gross
estate of his wife, W, and that the residuary taker under the will was their son,
S. Assume further that W, the family breadwinner, died one year later in
1975, leaving her $560,000 taxable estate to S. Whether or not W had disclaimed her interest in T's estate thereby immediately passing that interest to
S, T's estate would have zero tax liability.26 On the other hand, if W had
effectively disclaimed her interest in T's estate, W's taxable estate would be
lowered from $560,000 to $500,000,27 and a $19,200 tax savings would be
achieved. S would receive $414,300 instead of $395,100.28
21. By so informing the transferees within three months of the decedent's death, the executor can eliminate any argument by a transferee that he is entitled to make a disclaimer
after the due date of the estate tax return. The estate tax return, Form 706, is due nine
months after the decedents death. I.R.C. §6075(a).
22. "Disclaimer" and "renunciation" are used interchangeably throughout this article.
Different states use these terms to represent the same concept. Compare, e.g., the Alaska
"renunciation" legislation, ALAsKA STAT. §13.11.295 (1973), with the Arkansas "disclaimer"
legislation, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§62.3201-.3212 (West 1971).
23. IR.C. §2518; UPC §2-801; UPC §2-801 (1973 version). This definition was also applicable under common law. See Towson v. Tickell, 3 Barn Aid 31, 106 Eng. Rep. 575 (1819);
Allison v. Smith, 16 Mich. 404 (1868).
24. See Hardenbergh v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir. 1952), in which the difference
between a valid and invalid renunciation was a gift tax on $84,105.88 to each of two parties
on transfer. If their renunciations were valid, there was no gift tax to be paid by passage of
the $168,211.76 to a third party; if not valid, the renunciations were effective gift transfers
subject to chapter 12 taxes. The court held the renunciations invalid, thereby imposing the
gift tax on the disclaimants.
25. The impact of disclaiming an at-death transfer is necessarily twofold. (1) The estate
tax consequences may be altered, e.g., if either the disclaimant or subsequent taker is a spouse
or charity, the adjusted gross estate and therefore the ultimate tax liability will be altered.
(2) The gift tax consequences will be altered: if the disclaimer is not valid, the passage of the
interest to the succeeding taker will constitute a gift from the diclaimant for chapter 12
purposes.
26. I.R.C. §2052 (1975) provided a $60,000 exemption from the value of the gross estate.
Thus, the I.R.C. §2051 taxable estate would be zero. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 replaced
the §2052 exemption with a credit under §2010 of $47,000. Pub. L. No. 94-455, §2001(a)(2),
(a)(4), & (d)(1), 90 Stat. 1420, 1848, 1854, 1976-3 CB. 324, 330.
27. I.R.C. §2056(d) (1975) provided for disclaimers by surviving spouses to be treated as
passing directly to the successor in interest as a result of the disclaimer. Section 2056(d) was
repealed. Pub. L. No. 94-455, §§2009(b)(4)(D), (e)(2), 90 Stat. 1895, 1896, 1976-3 C.B. 371, 372.
28. I.R.C. §2001(c) (1975) provided the requisite rate of tax. It is noteworthy that throughout this article the emphasis is on the disclaimer of at-death transfers other than generation-
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It is noteworthy that a spouse's disclaimer of an estate interest often has a
dual tax effect. For example, assume T's adjusted gross estate was $70,000 instead of $60,000. If W disclaims her interest she can affect both her own gift
tax and T's estate tax. By disclaiming the interest instead of accepting and
then giving it to S,W avoids paying any gift tax.29 On the other hand, the
marital deduction allowed if W were the beneficiary is lost when W disclaims
her interest.30 Thus, instead of no estate tax liability, there would be an estate
tax of $500.31
DIscLAIMRS PRIOR TO DECEMBER 31, 1976
A valid disclaimer for federal estate and gift tax determinations was, with
33
two exceptions,32 defined generally by the Treasury Regulations. First, a dis-

claimer had to be effective under local law.34 A disclaimer was defined as "a
5
complete and unqualified refusal to accept the rights to which one is entitled,"38
a definition which merely repeated the local law notion of renunciation.
Additionally, the Regulations provided, as did local law,37 that renunciation
could not follow acceptance.38 However, the timing provision set forth in the
Regulations differed from local law.39 Local law generally required a disclaimer
to be made within a reasonable time after the transferred interest was indeskipping transfers. The emphasis is purposeful because in the vast majority of disclaimer cases
the estate and gift tax consequences of such disclaimers are at issue. However, the possibility
of disclaiming inter vivos gifts, I.R.C. §2518, or generation-skipping transfers, I.RC. §2614,
should not be overlooked.
§25.2511-1(c) (1958), which provides that a qualified disclaimer "does
29. See TREAs. REaG.
not constitute the making of a gift" by the disclaimant.
S0. See TREAs. REG. §20.2056(d)-l(a) (1958), which provides that upon a qualified disclaimer by a surviving spouse, such "disclaimed interest is to be considered as having passed
from the decedent to the person or persons entitled to receive the interest as a result of he
disclaimer."
31. I.R.C. §2001(c) (1975) provided the requisite rate of tax.
32. I.R.C. §2056(d)(2) (1975) provided that disclaimers which caused an increase in the
surviving spouse's estate share were valid if made within the filing period for the estate tax
return. I.R.C. §6075(a) provides a filing time requirement of nine months after the date of
the decedent's death.
I.R.C. §2055(a) (1975) provided that disclaimers which caused an increase in charitable
deductions were valid if made within the nine month filing period for the estate tax return.
33. TREAS. REG. §§20.2056(d)-I, 25.2511-1(c), 25.2514-3(c)(5) (1958). Clearly, Congress, in
passing §§2518, 2045 and 2614(c), invalidated these Regulations. See notes 115-118 infra and
accompanying text discussing why §2518 should be read to provide the exclusive means of
effecting a valid federal disclaimer.
34. For an in-depth discussion of local disclaimers, see Finnel, Disclaimers and the
MaritalDeduction: A Need for Adequate State Legislation, 21 U. FLA. L. Rlv. 1 (1968).
35. TREAs. REO. §20.2056(d)-I (1958).
36. See, e.g., Goodsman v. Jannsen, 234 Iowa 925, 14 N.W.2d 647 (1944).
37. See, e.g., Re Kalt's Estate, 16 Cal. 2d 807, 108 P.2d 401 (1940), in which the court noted
and applied the general rule that a beneficiary could not renounce an interest in property
after he had accepted any of the rights to which he was entitled.
38. TREAs. REG. §25.2511-1(c) (1958).
39. See notes 48-67 infra and accompanying text discussing the conflict between local
law and the Regulations as seen in Keinath v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1973).
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feasibly fixed in the person making the disclaimer. 40 In apparent addition to
the local law timing requirement, 4' the Regulations further required a disclaimer to be made within "areasonable time after knowledge of the existence
of the transfer."42 Both the local law validity and the timing requirements of
the Regulations were the cause of considerable controversy.
The requirement of local law effectiveness resulted in a significant inequality among like taxpayers..A refusal to accept property in one state would
be an effective disclaimer for federal tax purposes, while the same refusal in
another state would not.4 3 For example, in Hardenberghv. Commissioner,7" the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Minnesota common law would not
allow renunciation of an intestate interest.45 Without a statute to the contrary,
there was no right to renounce title to an interest in a decedent's estate which
vested in the taxpayer by operation of law.46 On the other hand, in those states
which had passed statutes in derogation of common law allowing for renunciation of intestate interests,47 the Hardenbergh disclaimer would be effective.48
The unequal treatment of like taxpayers thus became an important argument
of those calling for a new, uniform disclaimer rule.49

However, the reasonable time standard came to be the single most contro40. See, e.g., Strom v. Wood, 100 Kan. 556, 164 P. 1100 (1917). Also, under the 1968 version
of the UPC, the model for twelve current state statutes, the time for a valid disclaimer does
not begin until "six months after ...the interest is finally ascertained." UPC §2-801(b) (1968
version). See Appendices C, D infra. And even more clearly under the most recent UPC,
adopted in six states to date, the time does not begin to run until after "the interest is
finally ascertained and his interest indefeasibly vested." UPC §2-801(b). See Appendices B, D
infra.
41. See Keinath v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1973), in which the court held
that the federal timing standard was the local law standard and no more. Contra George F.
Jewett, Jr., 70 T.C. 430 (1978) (court reviewed opinion), in which the court, in refusing to
follow the Eighth Circuit decision in Keinath, held that the federal standard required a valid
local law disclaimer which was made, as required by Treasury Regulation §25.2511-1(c),
"within a reasonable time after knowledge of the existence of a transfer."
42. T"Aas. REG. §25.2511-1(c) (1958).
43. H.R. REP. No. 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, 1976-3 C.B. 800.
44. 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir. 1952).
45. The impact of the decision on the petitioners is discussed in note 24 supra.
46. 198 F.2d at 66. The common law view that intestate succession was passage by operation of law and therefore not an interest which could be renounced, is well established. See,
e.g., Payton v. Monroe, 110 Ga. 262, 34 S.E. 305 (1899). Contra Farnum v. Bryant, 34 N.H. 9
(1856), in which the court in dictum took a more practical view: "This right it was competent
for them to renounce or waive. It was no greater or more indefeasible than the right of a
devisee or legatee to the devise or legacy given him under a will; and it is well settled that
such devise or legacy may be waived or renounced by some unequivocal act." Id. at 19.
Farnum, however, has since been overruled, bringing New Hampshire into line with all other
states in which the question of renunciation of intestate interests has arisen. See Bradley v.
State, 100 N.H. 232, 235, 123 A.2d 148, 151 (1956).
47. To date forty-two states have passed laws allowing the renunciation of intestate
shares. Only Alabama, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, South Carolina,
Vermont, and Wyoming have not passed such laws. See Appendix D infra.
48. Even Minnesota, the state whose law was at issue in Hardenbergh,has since changed
its law to allow for the renunciation of intestate interests, See MINN. STAT. §525.532 (1978).
49. See note 3 supra.
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versial aspect of the prior law.5 ° The case bringing this issue to the forefront of
legal controversy was Keinath v. Commissioner.51 A thorough examination of
Keinath is appropriate because it was that case which was foremost in the minds
of the drafters of section 2518.52 The holder of a remainder interest subject to
divestiture had renounced his remainder interest six months after the death of
the life beneficiary - that death being the event after which the remainder
interest was no longer subject to divestiture. 3 The renunciation was also nineteen years after the transfer creating the remainder interest. The disclaimant
had been aware of the transfer at the time it was made.5 4 The issue was not
whether a reasonable time had elapsed prior to the renunciation - clearly, six
months was reasonable and nineteen years was not.5 Rather, the issue was
whether the reasonable time was measured from when the disclaimant learned
of the transfer or from when the interest transferred became indefeasible.
The Tax Court held that the time was measured from when the disclaimant
learned of the transfers6 Thus, the nineteen year delay to renounce the interest
was clearly unreasonable and the disclaimer was ineffective. The court reasoned
that the Treasury Regulations, buttressed by a prior Tax Court case,57 established a double test for a valid federal disclaimer: (1) effectiveness under local
law, and (2) occurrence within a reasonable time after the disclaimant learns
of the transfer. 5 Since the second test was not met due to the nineteen year
delay before renunciation, the disclaimer was not effective for federal tax purposes. This result was reached notwithstanding the effectiveness of the disclaimer under the first test of local law effectiveness.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 59 The court began by recognizing the Treasury's right to define disclaimers for federal estate and gift
tax purposes in a manner more restrictive than state law. 60 Then the court
changed directions and declared:
50. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, 1976-3 C.B. 800, in which the
committee focused on the Keinath case in explaining why the timing standard was being
changed.
51. 480 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1973), rev'g, 58 T.C. 352 (1972).
52. See note 50 supra.
53. The testator devised most of his estate to a trust with the life interest to his wife and
the remainder interest to his two sons. If, however, either of the sons predeceased the mother,
their interests were to pass per stirpes to their children. Thus, during the life of the mother,
the income beneficiary, the children held remainder interest subject to divestment if they
failed to survive the mother. Nineteen years following testator's death the mother died, and
six months thereafter one of the children disclaimed his remainder interest. 480 F.2d at 59.
54. Id. at 60.
55. Id. at 61.
56. Keinath v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 352 (1972), rev'd, 480 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1973).
57. Kathryn S. Fuller, 37 T.C. 147 (1961).
58. 58 T.C. at 359-60.
59. 480 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1973).
60. "[W]e think the Commissioner has the right in the Treasury Regulations to set forth
the conditions under which disclaimers will be recognized." Id. at 61. The court's statement
was in response to the petitioner's argument that Brown v. Routzman, 63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 290 U.S. 641 (1933), established the proposition that valid local law disclaimers
necessarily were valid federal disclaimers.
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In determining "reasonable time" and the related issue of when the
reasonable time period commences, we perforce, absent a federal statute
or regulation defining reasonable time, must look to the law of the states.
We are not conclusively bound by the state law, but this is the only field
to probe for legal decisions and discussions on the phrase "reasonable
time" as used in the context of making disdaimers. 61
The court next found that under Minnesota law the reasonable time period
commenced when the interest became indefeasible.62 Thus, the six month
period prior to the disclaimer was a reasonable time and the disclaimer was
upheld for federal estate and gift tax purposes.
When the appellate court changed direction, it misstated the case. 3 The
court correctly identified the lack of a federal "reasonable time" definition and
was arguably justified in looking to state law for that definition.64 As to the
issue of when that time period commenced, however, the court was dearly mistaken in turning to state law. 65 The court itself had, in the preceding para-

graph, recognized that the Regulations did take a position. In fact, the court
had gone so far as to state that position: "The disclaimer must be made within
a reasonable time after knowledge of the existence of the transfer."66 Thus, the

appellate court had no reason to turn to state law on the commencement issue.
Even under the appellate court's view of the weight to be given the Regulations
61. 480 F.2d at 61-62.
62. "We hold therefore, that under the prevailing common law and, in particular, the
jurisdiction of the State of Minnesota, the holder of a vested remainder interest subject to
divestiture has a reasonable time within which to renounce or disclaim the remainder interest
after the death of the life beneficiary." Id. at 64.
63. Perhaps, to say that the court misstated the case is too lenient. It may also have misstated the law. See text accompanying note 61 supra. The court in effect declared that when
a question of federal law has no federal statutory or regulatory answer, the court must look
to state law. Only within the discretion of Commissioner v. Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967), could
the court vary from what state law provides. This conception is a remarkable view of federal
law, to say the least. Apparently, the court was trying to articulate the doctrine that "state
law creates legal interests and rights." Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 80 (1940). Even
so, that doctrine is not applicable where, as in Keinath, the question is what state-created
interests and rights will be chosen to be taxed under Federal Revenue Acts. Id. at 81. The
court had just recognized this issue in denying the Routzahn argument, see note 60 supra,
before its ill-fated attempt to articulate the applicable federal doctrine. 480 F.2d at 61.
64. But see the Tax Court's opinion in Keinath, holding the reasonable time standard of
the Regulation to be separate from and in addition to the local law timing requirements. 58
T.C. at 359. In 1978 the Tax Court reaffirmed its position in George F. Jewett, Jr., 40 T.C.
430 (1978), refusing to follow the Eighth Circuit decision in Keinath. Likewise, in Estate of
Robin v. Commissioner, - F.2d - (2d Cir. 1978), aff'g, 68 T.C. 919 (1977), the Second Circuit
in dicta in footnote number 6, accepted the Tax Court position. Also in line wth the Tax
Court position is the reasoning employed in Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188, 193 (1938), holding
that local law interpretations of federal statutory terms are not determinative of federal law.
65. Treasury Regulations will be upheld unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent
with the revenue statutes. Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496 (1948).
66. 480 F.2d at 61. Another difficulty with adopting the Minnesota common law commencement period is that it runs counter to the federal estate gift tax concept of valuation at
date of transfer without regard to future occurrences. See Ithica Trust Co. v. United States,
279 U.S. 151 (1929).
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in defining valid disclaimers,67 it is clear that the Regulations' standard, beginning the reasonable time after knowledge of the transfer, should have been
upheld.
In light of this error, it is clear that the Tax Court, and not the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals, was correct. In any event, the petitioner was granted
a nineteen year period following transfer in which to claim a defeasible interest. Thus, like the Hardenbergh decision, Keinath added weight to the argument of those calling for new, uniform disclaimer rules.68 And, more importantly, Keinath was the catalyst for those calling for a specific, mechanical
timing device for valid disclaimers.69
POST-DECEMBER 31, 1976 DIsCLAnas: SECON 2518

In the Tax Reform Act of 1976 Congress replaced the disclaimer rules discussed above with section 2518.70 It is applicable to each of the federal
gratuitous transfer taxes- estate,7 1 generation- skipping transfer,1 2 and gift73
- with respect to transfers made after December 31, 1976.74 Section 2518(a)
provides the general rule for treatment of a disclaimer interest. A transfer of
an interest in property will be treated as if it had never been made to the
disclaimant, provided that the disclaimant makes a "qualified disclaimer."75
Section 2518(b), the heart of the new section, defines "qualified disclaimers."
The prologue of section 2518(b) requires the disclaimer to be "an irrevocable
and unqualified refusal . . .to accept an interest in property."7 6 The specific
requirements of a "qualified disclaimer" are listed in subsections 2518(b)(1)-(4).
The disclaimer must be in writing.77 The writing must be received by one of
three parties: (1)the transferor, (2) the transferor's legal representative, or (3)

67. See note 63 supra for a discussion of the appellate court's view of the weight to be
given the Regulations.
68. See, e.g., Newman & Kalter, supra note 2.
69. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, 1976-3 C.B. 800, in which the
committee focused on the Keinath case in explaining why a new timing standard was necessary.
70. Pub. L. No. 94-455, §2009(b)(I), 90 Stat. 1520, 1893, 1976-3 C.B. 1.

71. I.R.C. §2045.
72. I.R.C. §2614(c).
73. I.R.C. §2518.
74. Pub. L. No. 94-455, §2009(e)(2), 90 Stat. 1520, 1896, 1976-3 C.B. 372, providing the
effective date for disclaimers under the Tax Reform Act of 1976.
75. I.R.C. §2518(a). This treatment of disclaimers is simply a codification of local law.
E.g., UPC §2-801(c) (1968 version) provides that "renunciation relates back for all purposes to
"
the date of death of the decedent.. ..
76. I.R.C. §2518(b). This subsection simply restates prior federal and local law. See notes
35-36 supra and accompanying text.
77. I.R.C. §2518(b)(1). Compare, e.g., Olsen v. Wright, 119 N.J. Eq. 103, 181 A. 182 (Ch.
1935) (common law acceptance of oral disclaimers recognized) with UPC §2-801(a)(i)-(iii) (1968
version), which requires a writing. But unlike §2518, the UPC specifies the contents of the
writing: "The instrument shall (i) describe the property or part thereof or interest therein
renounced, (ii) be signed by the person renouncing and (iii) declare the renunciation and
the extent thereof."
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the holder of the legal title to the property involved7 8 Further, it must be received no later than nine months after the transfer-9 or, if the disclaimant is less
than twenty-one years old, within nine months following the attainment of age
twenty-one.80 The disclaimant cannot have accepted any of the benefits from
the interest being disclaimed."' Lastly, as a result of the disclaimer, the interest
78. I.R.C. §2518(b)(2). Notably, local law may require filing not only with the personal
representative, but also with the county court which would probate the decedents estate, e.g.,
UPC §2-801(b) (1968 version). Sometimes the recorder of deeds must be notified if a real
property interest is being disclaimed, e.g., UPC §2-801(b)(3). Because a valid federal disclaimer
is dependent on a valid local disclaimer pursuant to §2518(b)(4), the state filing requirement
must be met. Clearly, such local limitations will render anything but uniform results.
79. I.R.C. §2518(b)(2)(A), which matches the estate tax filing period under §6075(a) of
nine months after the death of the decedent. Cf. I.R.C. §2056(d)(2) (1975), which also provided for a disclaimer period tied to the §6075(a) estate filing period. The time period was
applicable only where the disclaimer would act to enlarge the marital deduction; otherwise,
the reasonable time standard was applicable.
Notably, twenty-one states have timing devices which limit disclaimers to periods following death from two to seven months. See Appendix D infra. Clearly, pursuant to subsection
2518(b)(4), the local law timing standard in twenty-one states will limit federal disclaimers,
producing anything but uniform results.
Query, whether under §2518 the right to disclaim is personal to the disclaimant. For example, if a disclaimant died before the requisite time period had run, query whether his
personal representative could disclaim the interest on behalf of the disclaimant's estate. Under
prior federal law, the question was decided by local law. E.g., Estate of Rolin v. Commissioner,
- F.2d - (2d Cir. 1978), aff'g, 68 T.C. 919 (1977), in which New York law was applied to a
pre-1977 transfer in allowing an executor to disclaim an unexercised general power of appointment. The new statute, however, gives no indication of the answer, except perhaps in
subsection 2518(b)(2)(A). Minors are excepted from the nine month after-death limitation,
and instead are limited to nine months following their twenty-first birthday. I.R.C. §2518
@b)(2)Q3). Presumably, such an exception would not have been necessary were not the right to
disclaim a personal one; if the right were not personal, the child's guardian would be able to
exercise and there would be no need for the extended disclaimer period for minors. Compare
MmN. STAT. §525.532.2 (1978), which provides that guardians and personal representatives
can exercise the disclaimant's right to renounce, with UPC §2-801(a), which provides that the
right to renounce will not survive the disclaimant, but does not speak to minor's interest. At
common law there was no clear answer. Compare Rock Island Bank & Trust Co. v. First Natl
Bank, 26 Ill.
2d 47, 185 N.E.2d 890 (1962) (right to disclaim held personal to the disclaimant)
with Perkins v. Phinney, 7 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d g145,517 (W.D. Tex. 1961) (disclaimer by the
executor of the disclaimant held "fair, reasonable, and natural'). See Finnel, supra note 34, at
16 for a discussion of those cases.
80. I.R.C. §2518(b)(2)(B). It is laudable that Congress has recognized the inequity in requiring minors to make disclaimers within nine months of transfer. Paradoxically, however,
Congress provided no relief in a much more burdensome area, that of the uninformed disclaimant. The hardship is clear in both instances. See notes 108-120 infra and accompanying
text discussing the hardships to the uninformed disclaimant. The extended time period was
not the only available solution to the minors' disclaimer issue. See note 79 supra discussing
the availability to a guardian of a right to disclaim. Yet, for the uninformed disclaimant there
is no solution other than an extended time period. See notes 108-120 infra and accompanying

text.
81. I.R.C. §2518(b)(3). Compare TREAs. REc,. §25.2511-1(c)(1958), which provided the same
rule. See generally, Finnel, supra note 34, at 5-7; 93 A.L.R. 2d 8, 34-54 (1961), in which the
question of what constitutes acceptance at common law is thoroughly discussed. See notes
83-84 infra discussing the effect of partial disclaimers on the acceptance issue.
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must pass without direction to one other than the disclaimant or the decedent's spouse.8 2
Section 2518(c) adds some clarification for the application of subsections
(a) and (b). A disclaimer of an undivided portion of an interest is a qualified
disclaimer.83 Thus, it is clear that such a renunciation will not be considered as
acceptance of benefits from the interest disclaimed.8 4 Additionally, the powers
8 5
with respect to property are deemed to be interests in such property.
The objective of section 2518 was to end the disparate treatment of identical
refusals to accept property interests. 8 6 Because the federal rules prior to the Tax
Reform Act of 1976 deferred to local law in determining the validity of a given
disclaimer, a refusal in one state would be recognized for federal tax purposes
while an identical refusal in another state would not. 7 Section 2518 was enacted to eliminate this disparity by creating a definitive federal disclaimer
standard which was not dependent on local law.88 Additionally, the drafters
were particularly disturbed by the inequality resulting from the Keinath
82. I.R.C. §2518(b)(4), as amended by the Revenue Act of 1978. Pub. L. No. 95-600,
§702(m), - Stat. -, 1978-C.B. -, -. Prior to the amendment, it was unclear whether a
decedent's spouse could disclaim an interest which upon disclaimer passed to a residuary trust
of which the disclaimant's spouse was an income beneficiary. See R. STEPHENS, supra note 17,
IT0.10(2)(d). I.R.C. §2518(b)(4) by necessary implication defers the federal question of valid
disclaimers to local law. See Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932), which sets forth the
doctrine that only by necessary implication or by express adoption will a federal statute be
interpreted as governed by local law.
83. I.R.C. §2518(c)(1). It is clear that under §2518(b)(3) an income beneficiary cannot accept a payment and then disclaim the rest. Likewise, it is clear that under §2518(c)(1) an individed portion of an interest in property may be disclaimed without disclaiming the entire
interest. Although it is not clear from the statute, a partial disclaimer should also be allowed,
e.g., the renunciation of ten shares of a hundred share bequest of stock. The Internal Revenue
Service has indicated that this will be its position in Ltr. Rul. 7849009, which gives as an example of a permissible partial disclaimer the renunciation of "1/20 of your 1/5 interest in
your father's marital trust." The issue under common law was not resolved; however, it often
turned on whether a gift was severable or not. See, e.g., Oglesby v. Springfield Marine Bank,
395 Ill. 37, 69 N.E.2d 269 (1946). See Finnel, supra note 34, at 4-7; 93 A.L.R. 2d at 34-54, 60-62
(1961). Subsection 2518(c)(1) seems aimed at the severability test. It takes the least severable
partial disclaimer, an undivided portion, and declares that it may be disclaimed. Thus, other
partial disclaimers should also be treated as "qualified disclaimers." Perhaps, by its limited
reference to partial disclaimers, §2518 is intended to continue the approach found in TRnAs.
REG. §25.2511-1(c) (1958) which provides: "In any case where a refusal is purported to relate
to only a part of the property, the determination of whether or not there has been a complete
and unqualified refusal to accept ownership will depend on all of the facts and circumstances."
Notably, local law under common law, and most state statutes have the same uncertainties.
See, e.g., UPC §801(a) (1968 version), which provides for disclaimers in "whole or in part."
Clearly, the questions of partial disclaimers and acceptances will vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction and, unless the federal view is narrowest, federal law pursuant to subsection
2518(b)(4) will produce anything but uniform results.
84. Compare I.R.C. §2518(c) with §2518(b)(3). See note 83 supra.
85. I.R.C. §2518(c)(2). This provision insures against arguments that powers are not
interests and therefore are not subject to renunciation. See Finnel, supra note 34, at 28.
86. H.R. REP.No. 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65-68, 1976-3 C.B. 799-802.
87. H.R. REP. No. 94-1380 at 66, 1976-3 C.B. at 800.
88. H.R. REP. No. 94-1380 at 66-67, 1976-3 C.B. at 800-801.
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decision.89 Instead of measuring a reasonable time from when an interest was
no longer subject to divestiture, a state might measure from when the interest
was created. 0 The nineteen years which elapsed after creation in Keinath
would dearly be unreasonable. 91 Thus the keynote of section 2518, particularly
with respect to timing, was uniformity.
Unfortunately, the legislation does not implement its stated goal. Although
no specific reference to local law is made, subsection 2518(b)(4) requires that
"as a result of such refusal, the interest passes without any direction on the
part of the person making the disclaimer and passes either - (A) to the spouse
of the decedent, or (B) to a person other than the person making the disclaimer." 92 Whether an interest passes as required by subsection 2518(b)(4),
however, is a question not spoken to by federal law. Rather, the creation of
property interests is a question on which federal revenue laws have traditionally deferred to local law. 93 Thus, as before the Tax Reform Act of 1976,
if a disclaimer is not effective under local law, it is not effective under federal
law.
For example, assume that in 1977, D dies intestate under the law of New
Hampshire, survived by his wife, W, and their son, S. Assume further that W
would like to pass her intestate share to S. New Hampshire, however, does not
permit renunciation of intestate shares.94 Thus, passage of W's intestate share
to S would necessarily be at W's direction, and not by operation of law, as it
would be if her renunciation were valid under local law.95 The transfer to S,
being at W's direction, violates subsection 2518(b)(4) and therefore is a gift
subject to chapter 12 gift tax consequences.
On the other hand, if D's estate were controlled by one of the states which
allows renunciation of intestate shares, 96 there would be no gift tax. The
passage of W's intestate share to S would be pursuant to state law and not at
W's direction.97 Subsection 2518(b)(4) would be met, and the renunciation
would be valid for federal estate and gift tax purposes. Clearly, the new legislation has failed in its primary objective of uniformity.
It is criticism of one kind to argue that the goal of present legislation is not
uriiversally agreed upon and that the legislation therefore should be replaced.
Such criticism is a part of healthy public debate over legislative objectives.
Congress, however, may properly ignore such criticism if it decides its objective
is sound.
89. H.R. RP. No. 94-1380 at 66, 1976-3 C.B. at 800.
90. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §512 (1974), which provides for a disclaimer period
of 120 days after death, subject to extension by the Court of Chancery.
91. 480 F.2d at 62.

92. I.R.C. §2518(b)(4). See note 82 supra.
93. See Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932).
94. Bradley v. State, 100 N.H. 232, 236, 123 A.2d 148, 151 (1956). Eight states currently
have no legislation permitting disclaimers of intestate interests. See Appendix D infra.
95. See Hardenbergh v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir. 1952).
96. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §113-824 (1975). See Appendix D infra listing the states
which have passed intestate disclaimer legislation.

97. See, e.g., id., which provides for passage as if the disclaimant has predeceased the
transferor.
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On the other hand, where Congress and the reformers agree on a proper
objective, the only question is that of implementation. There may be some
argument without clear answers over proper implementation; but there is no
room for debate where the statute simply does not carry out the agreed-upon
objectives. The statute must be amended. Such is the task with which Congress
is now faced regarding the disclaimer statute. The goal of uniformity by
eliminating deference to local law is widely accepted."" Yet, the enactment does
not accomplish the objective. It is clear that Congress should replace subsection
2518(b)(4) with legislation which will implement the objective of uniformity.
It has been suggested that this replacement should follow the format provided by the American Bar Association's Section on Taxation. 99 Such a provision would nevertheless allow a disclaimer which was ineffective for local
purposes to be a qualified disclaimer if the disclaimant transferred the property interest to the person who would have taken had the disclaimant predeceased the transferor.100 This provision certainly meets the requirement of
uniformity for disclaimers of at-death transfers. It is noteworthy that it does
so by deferring to local law in identifying to whom the interest must pass. 01
This factor is important because, in and of itself, deference to local law is not
the problem; rather, the problem is deference to local law which causes like
refusals to be treated differently. The ABA provision does, however, have one
weakness. It is only a patrial solution, since it speaks only to at-death transfers
02
without solving the questions surrounding lifetime transfers.
The uniform results of the ABA proposal can be achieved for both at-death
and lifetime transfers by a simple modification of subsection 2518(b)(4) rather
than a separate rule for gifts. Section 2518(b)(4) would remain unchanged except for the addition of a proviso for instances in which local law would otherwise limit the federal rule. In whole, it would read as follows:
(4) as a result of such refusal, the interest passes to a person other than
the person making the disclaimer (without any direction on the part of
the person making the disclaimer). 03 Provided, however, that if a dis98. See H. R. REP. No. 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 n.5, 1976-3 C.B. 800 n.5, in which
the Conference Committee declared: 'Tour committee notes that many professional study
groups have recommended that definitive rules be provided with respect to the treatment of
disclaimers for estate and gift tax purposes. See American Bar Association recommendation
number 1974-2. 27 Tax Lawyer 818 (1974); American Law Institute recommendations 21 and
22. Federal Estate and Gift Taxation: Recommendations Adopted by the American Law
Institute, pp. 39-41 (1968); Tax Reform Studies and Proposals; U. S. Treasury Department,
p. 387 (1969); American Bankers Association, Commentary on Proposed Tax Reform Affecting
Estates and Trusts, p. 166 of appendix A (1973)."
99. Committee on Estate and Gift Taxes, Legislative Recommendation No. 2, 27 TAx
LAW. 818-25 (1974).
100. Newman & Kalter, Disclaimers After TRA, 116 TRusTs g Esr., 293, 295 (1977).
101. Clearly, the question of passage as if the disclaimant had predeceased the transferor
is decided by local law. Either the will as allowed by state law, or the descent and distribution
rules under state law, will control passage where the transferee predeceases the transferor.
102. The transferor in a lifetime transfer, a gift, is not dead; thus, defining passage of
interest in terms of predeceasing the transferor is meaningless.
103. I.R.C. §2518(b)(4), following the Revenue Act of 1978. See note 82 supra.
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claimer is invalid under local law, thereby not passing the interest without direction of the person making the disclaimer, that the disclaimer
will qualify under this subsection if it passes at the direction of the
person making the disclaimer to the person who would have received it
added to denote the sugunder a valid local law disclaimer. (Emphasis
10 4
2518(b)(4)).
to
subsection
addition
gested
l °5
Applying this modified rule to the above example concerning renunciation of an intestate share in a state such as New Hampshire, the unequal treatment provided for under the current rule is avoided. New Hampshire's refusal
to recognize renunciations of intestate shares would invoke the suggested additional proviso. Since New Hampshire law would have passed the interest to S
had it recognized disclaimers of intestate shares, W's directed transfer to S
would meet the requirements of the "provided" caveat. Thus, there would be
no federal gift tax consequences to W upon the transfer to S. New Hampshire
citizens would be given the same opportunity to renounce intestate shares for
federal tax purposes as are citizens of the majority of jurisdictions which recognize renunciations of intestate shares.
Subsection 2518(b)(4) also defeats the intent of uniformity underlying the
enactment of the subsection 2518(b)(2) timing provision. A timely federal disclaimer must be made within nine months of the transfer creating the interest.
State law, however, will often limit valid renunciations to those within six
months of the transfer' 0 6 The relatively minor discrepancy would be eliminated by the above suggested amendment to subsection 2518(b)(4).107
Uniformity, however, is not the major difficulty with the new timing provision; the problem is its mechanical nature, which will lead to unnecessarily
08
harsh results in the name of administrative ease.. Administrative ease is
achieved by making the validity period the same as the nine month filing
period for the estate tax return' 0 9 In some instances, this mechanical rule will
blindly limit postmortem estate planning; it will simply not allow disclaimers

104. Instead of stating a general proposition dependent on state law for its operation, this

amendment simply defers to state law. This deference, unlike that implicit in current §2518

(b)(4), does not cause like disclaimers in different jurisdictions to be treated inconsistently. It
merely permits local law to decide to whom the disclaimed interest must pass.

105. See notes 94-95 supra and accompanying text.

106. See, e.g., UPC §2-801(b) (1968 version), which provides a time limit of six months
following death. Note, however, that under the 1968 UPC, as under most state laws, Keinath

results are still possible where the taker has not been ascertained or where his interest has

not been indefeasibly vested.
107. The discrepancy is minor because the thought behind the §2518(b)(2) timing pro-

vision was not precise similarity but prevention of such gross situations as the nineteen-year
period allowed in Keinath. See notes 50-69 supra and accompanying text.

108. See R. STEPHENS, supra note 17, 710.10(2)(d), in which the following hypothetical was
posed: "T creates an irrevocable inter vivos trust naming specific beneficiaries but giving D a

general power of appointment over the remainder. If D is not informed of the existence of the
power until a year after its creation he is unable to make a 'qualified disclaimer' under

Section 2518, even though he attempts to do so immediately upon learning of the existence of
the power."
109. See I.R.C. §2056(d)(2) (1975) which also tied the disclaimer time limit to the estate
tax filing deadline.
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by those who were not informed of their interests until nine months after the
transfer. 110 In other cases, the results will be devastating.
For example, assume that T, a Florida resident, dies in 1981 leaving
$500,000 in trust naming his children, A, B, and C, as the income beneficiaries
for the life of D, T's brother. Additionally, assume that D is given a general
power of appointment over the remainder which power, if not exercised, will
pass to A, B, and C. Assume further that D dies intestate one year after T without being informed of his general power, leaving an estate worth $200,000.
Thus, the power passes to A, B, and C, who exercise it in favor of themselves.
Under Florida law, D's estate passes to his son, E, as his only living relative."
Unfortunately, D's taxable estate is not valued at the expected $200,000, but
rather is valued at $700,000 because of D's failure to disclaim his general power
of appointment over the $500,000 remainder interest. E, after estate taxes, receives a mere $17,200.112 Were D's executor able to renounce the power within
a reasonable time after learning of its existence, E would receive $192,200.11
A difference of $187,300 is one E will be certain to notice and a difference
4
which, under the current version of subsection 2518(b)(2), is unavoidable."
It may be argued that section 2518 was not intended to be the exclusive
means for making a federal disclaimer." 5 Such an interpretation of section
2518, however, is difficult to justify in light of its legislative history, which calls
for definitive, therefore uniform, federal disclaimer legislation. 116 Clearly, it
would be more equitable to expand federal disclaimers to include those which
under prior federal common law principles were made within a reasonable
time after knowledge of the transfer." 7 The legislative history, however, is to
the contrary. The House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee explained the general purpose of section 2518 as follows:
Reasons for Change
Your committee believes that definitive rules concerning disclaimers
110. See Appendix D infra.
111. FLA. STAT. §§732.102-103 (1977).
112. See I.R.C. §2041 which includes in the decedent's gross estate property subject to
general powers created after 1942 which are not exercised but are owned at death.
§2051 T.I.
200,000
700,000 §2041 T.I
at §2001(c) rates-FET
(54,800)
(229,800) at §2001(c) rates-FET
§2010 credit
47,000
47,000 §2010 credit
Net
received by E.
192,200
(500,000) Remainder Interest in
Gross Estate but not
passing to E.
17,200 Net received by E.
113. Under §2518 it is not clear whether a right to disclaim can survive the disclaimant.
See note 71 supra.
114. See notes 115-118 infra and accompanying text discussing the possibility that §2518
is not the exclusive means for making a qualified federal disclaimer.
115. See R. STEPHENS, supra note 17, f[10.10(b), in which the authors suggest that although
§2518 was enacted to provide a uniform rule on disclaimers, it was not necessarily enacted to
provide the exclusive rule on the subject.
116. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, 1976-3 C.B. 800.
117. See note 108 supra.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1978

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [1978], Art. 6

19781

SECTION 2518 DISCLAIMERS

should be provided for estate and gift tax purposes to achieve uniform
treatments. In addition, your committee believes that a uniform standard
for determining the time within which a disclaimer
should be provided
must be made."18
It seems clear, therefore, that the drafters of section 2518 intended for it to be
the exclusive means for disclaiming an interest for federal tax purposes.
Perhaps, for someone like D who has never known nor should have known
of the power, there is a viable argument that subsection 2518(b)(2) as applied
is unconstitutional. 1 9 The estate tax to be paid because of his swollen gross
estate arguably deprives D of his property without the due process required by
the fifth amendment12 0 On the other hand, for one who merely learns too late
to disclaim, but not too late to exercise, such a constitutional argument is
clearly foreclosed.1 2 ' Although the result may be in contrast to notions of fair
play in that such a person never has an opportunity to renounce, he is not deprived of his property. He can avoid the deprivation by simply exercising the
power in favor of his heirs. In any case, subsection 2518(b)(2) is arguably unconstitutional in some applications and clearly inequitable in others.
The objectives of subsection 2518(b)(2) were twofold: (1) to eliminate the
Keinath timing standard, 2 2 and (2) to foster administrative ease.1 23 Since
Keinath was decided improperly, it is a dubious basis for the new timing
standard. In fact, the whole debate over Keinath could have been avoided by
acceptance of the Tax Court decision.124 It will be recalled that the Tax Court
allowed disclaimers within a reasonable time after a disclaimant had learned
of the transfer creating the interest. Adoption of that standard, instead of the
subsection 2518(b)(2) mechanical nine month standard, would have avoided
118. H.R. REP. No. 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66-67, 1976-3 C.B. 800-01 (Emphasis
added).
119. Or, at least, a court might be persuaded to accept an argument such as that posed
by Professors Stephens, Maxfield, and Lind. See note 108 supra.
120. Cf. Coolidge v. Long, 282 U.S. 582, 605 (1931) (exercise of a state's taxing power on
the succession of property under trust instrument created before the tax repugnant to the
fourteenth amendment due process clause). See Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 325 (1932),
in which the Court declared: "That a federal statute passed under the taxing power may be
so arbitrary and capricious as to cause it to fall before the due process of law clause of the
Fifth Amendment is settled." See Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1 (1915), in
which the test for such constitutional questions is further qualified by requiring that the
statute as applied create a gross inequality. Query whether the facts posed in the text accompanying notes 110-114 supra presents such a gross inequality as to make §2518 as applied
an arbitrary and capricious exercise of the tax power in violation of the due process clause of
the fifth amendment.
121. The gross inequality test, and even the arbitrary and unreasonable test, cannot be
met in such an instance.
122. H.R. Rae. No. 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, 1976-3 C.B. 800.
123. Cf. I.R.C. §2055(a), 2056(d)(2) (1975). Presumably, although not indicated in the
legislative history of §§2055(a), 2056(d)(2) or 2518(b)(2), the matching of the estate tax return
period with the disclaimer period is to allow the executor to calculate once and for all the
federal estate tax due and thereby to provide an administrative convenience to both the
executor and the Internal Revenue Service.
124. Keinath v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 352 (1972), rev'd, 480 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1973). See
notes 50-69 supra and accompanying text.
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not only the Keinath extended disclaimer period, but also the inequalities of
an arbitrary timing device.
That solution, however, would not have the administrative convenience
found in the current statute, which requires that all disclaimers be made before
the end of the period for filing the estate tax return. Matching the nine month
filing period with the nine month disclaimer period is helpful to the administrator as well as to the Internal Revenue Service.12 5 The issue is therefore
whether the administrative convenience of subsection 2518(b)(2) can be attained without the inequalities of an arbitrary, unyielding timing standard. It
is submitted that the following amended subsection 2518(b)(2) will meet both
the needs of administrative ease and uniform application:
(2) such writing is received by the transferor of the interest, his legal
representative or the holder of the legal title to the property to which
the interest relates not later than the date which is 9 months after the
later of
(A) the date on which the transfer creating the interest in such person
is made, or
(B) the date on which such person attains age 21,126 and
(C) provided, that if the person making the disclaimer can prove by clear
and convincing evidence that he did not know of nor did he have
any reason to know of the transfer creating the interest, then the
person making the disclaimer will have 6 months from the date on
which he did know of or had reason to know of the transfer in which
to make his disclaimer. (Emphasis2 7 added to denote the suggested
addition to subsection 1518(b)(2)).1
The key to this amended timing provision is the placement of the burden
of administration upon those benefited by the limitation. Under current legislation, the burden is on the innocent, uninformed transferees, who are told that
they cannot disclaim because they must do so within the nine month estate tax
filing period for the convenience of the administrator of the transferor's estate.
Under the amended provision, the burden is placed squarely on the recipient
of the benefits - the administrator. The administrator of a transferor's estate
can foreclose disclaimers after the filing period by simply informing all the
transferees of their interests by certified, registered mail within the first three
months after the transferor's death. Having done so, the administrator has assured himself that the six month period following notice of the transfer will
fall within the nine month filing period.
On the other hand, if the administrator does not inform the transferees of
their interests, in most cases they will still be foreclosed from disclaiming their

125. See note 123 supra.
126. I.R.C. §2518(b)(2), following the Tax Reform Act of 1976.
127. Cf. CAL. PROB. CODE §190.03 (West 1972) (see Appendix D, n.13 infra); DEL. CODE
ANN. Cit. 12 §512(b) (1975) (see Appendix D, n.19 infra); FLA. STAT. §732.801(5) (1977) (see
Appendix D, n.21 infra); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 191A §3 (West 1974) (see Appendix D,
n.40 infra); 1977 N.Y. LAws ch. 861 §2-1.11(b) (1977) (see Appendix D, n.60 infra); Wis. STAT.
ANN. §852.13 (West 1978 Supp.) (see Appendix D, n.86 infra).
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interests after the filing period.1 28 In those cases in which the transferees can
prove by clear and convincing evidence that they did not learn of the transfer
until a later time, the inconvenience of the administrator is a proper price to
pay for a uniform disclaimer rule.
Additionally, the proposed amendment to subsection 2518(b)(2) would be
quite easy to administer.1 29 For example, upon T's death, his wife, W, would
have a difficult time convincing the court that she did not know of the transfer.
Being the natural bounty of T's affection and living with T when he died, W
would certainly be foreclosed from disclaiming her interest later than nine
months following T's death. On the other hand, if W were separated from T
and lived in another state, rarely communicating with T, she could overcome
her burden of proof if not informed of the transfer by the administrator. In the
vast majority of situations, there will be little basis to argue for an extension.
In those cases where there is room for argument, the burden will be on the disclaimant. And, if he can carry it, notions of fair play are satisfied by extending
his right to disclaim to six months after he is informed of the transfer.
CONCLUSION

Section 2518 has failed to implement its stated objective of uniformity.
Local law continues to control whether or not a disclaimer is valid for purposes of federal estate, gift, and generation-skipping transfer taxes. Additionally, the mechanical timing standard provided by section 2518 is unnecessarily harsh. Thus, both the timing standard and deference to local law should
be eliminated by amendments to the present legislation.
Uniformity can be achieved by allowing federal disclaimers without regard
to local law validity. The only needed tie to state law is a requirement that the

interest disclaimed pass to the person who would receive the interest if the
renunciation were effective under local law.
Mechanical, harsh results can be avoided with a more flexible timing
standard. By using a presumptive nine month standard, the administrative
convenience of a fixed time standard can be combined with the equitable
flexibility of a reasonable time standard.
DAvzD H. EVAUL
128. The amended statute contemplates greater than a nine month disclaimer period only
in extreme situations.
129. Compare the proposed amendment with H.R. REP. No. 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
12, 1976-5 C.B. 746, in which the committee noted: "The presumption that gifts made within
3 years of death are in contemplation of death has caused considerable litigation concerning
the motives of decedents in making gifts." Unlike pre-1977 §2035, the suggested amendment
to §2518 creates not a subjective question but an objective one hinged upon what the disclaimant should have known.
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APPENDIX A
MINN. STAT. §525.532

Four states have enacted disclaimer statutes modeled after the following statute enacted
first in 1965 by the Minnesota legislature. See Appendix D infra wherein the states are listed.
§525.532. Disclaimer of interests passing by will, intestate succession or under certain powers
of appointment.
Subdivision 1. As used in this section, unless otherwise clearly required by the context:
(a) "Beneficiary" means and includes any person entitled, but for his disclaimer, to
take an interest: by intestate succession; by devise; by legacy or bequest; by succession to a
disclaimed interest by will, intestate succession or through the exercise or nonexercise of a
testamentary power of appointment; by virtue of a renunciation and election to take
against a will, as beneficiary of a testamentary trust; pursuant to the exercise or nonexercise of a testamentary power of appointment; as donee of a power of appointment
created by testamentary instrument; or otherwise under a testamentary instrument;
(b) "Interest" means and includes the whole of any property, real or personal, legal or
equitable, or any fractional part, share or particular portion or specific assets thereof or
any estate in any such property or power to appoint, consume, apply or expend property
or any other right, power, privilege or immunity relating thereto;
(c) "Disclaimer" means a written instrument which declines, refuses, releases, renounces
or disclaims an interest which would otherwise be succeeded to by a beneficiary, which
instrument defines the nature and extent of the interest disclaimed thereby and which must
be signed, witnessed and acknowledged by the disclaimant in the manner provided for
deeds of real estate.
Subd. 2. A beneficiary may disclaim any interest in whole or in part, or with reference
to specific parts, shares or assets thereof, by filing a disclaimer in court in the manner hereinafter provided. A guardian, executor, administrator or other personal representative of
the estate of a minor, incompetent or deceased beneficiary, if he deems it in the best
interests of those interested in the estate of such beneficiary and of those who take the
beneficiary's interest by virtue of the disclaimer and not detrimental to the best interests
of the beneficiary, with or without an order of the probate court, may execute and file a
disclaimer on behalf of the beneficiary within the time and in the manner in which the
beneficiary himself could disclaim if he were living, of legal age and competent. A beneficiary likewise may execute and file a disclaimer by agent or attorney so empowered.
Subd. 3. Such disclaimer shall be filed at any time after the creation of the interest, but
in all events within six months after the death of the person by whom the interest was
created or from whom it would have been received, or, if the disclaimant is not finally
ascertained as a beneficiary or his interest has not become indefeasibly fixed both in
quality and quantity as of the death of such person, then such disclaimer shall be filed not
later than six months after the event which would cause him so to become finally ascertained and his interest to become indefeasibly fixed both in quality and quantity.
Subd. 4. Such disclaimer shall be effective upon being filed in the court in which the
estate of the person by whom the interest was created or from whom it would have been
received is, or has been, administered or, if no probate administration has been commenced, then in the court where it would be pending if commenced. A copy of the disclaimer shall be delivered or mailed to the personal representative, trustee or other person
having legal title to, or possession of, the property in which the interest disclaimed exists,
and no such representative, trustee or person shall be liable for any otherwise proper distribution or other disposition made without actual notice of the disclaimer. If an interest
in or relating to real estate is disclaimed, the original of the disclaimer, or a copy of the
disclaimer certified as true and complete by the clerk of the court wherein the same has
been filed, shall be filed in the office of the register of deeds or the register of titles, as
hereinafter provided, in the county or counties where the real estate is situated and shall
constitute notice to all persons only from and after the time of such filing. If title to such
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real estate has not been registered under the provisions of Minnesota Statutes, Chapter 508,
such disclaimer or certified copy shall be filed with the register of deeds. If title to such
real estate has been registered under the provisions of Minnesota Statutes, Chapter 508,
such disclaimer or certified copy shall be filed with the registrar of titles.
Subd. 5. Unless the person by whom the interest was created or from whom it would
have been received has otherwise provided by will or other appropriate instrument with
reference to the possibility of a disclaimer by the beneficiary, the property in which the
interest disclaimed shall descend, be distributed or otherwise be disposed of in the same
manner as if the disclaimant had died immediately preceding the death or other event
which causes him to become finally ascertained as a beneficiary and his interest to become
indefeasibly fixed both in quality and quantity, and, in any case, the disclaimer shall relate
for all purposes to such date, whether filed before or after such death or other event. However, one disclaiming an interest in a non-residuary gift, devise or bequest shall not be
excluded, unless his disclaimer so provides, from sharing in a gift, devise or bequest of
the residue even though, through lapse, such residue includes the assets disclaimed. An
interest of any nature in or to the estate of an intestate may be declined, refused or disclaimed as herein provided without ever vesting in the disclaimant.
Subd. 6. The right to disclaim otherwise conferred by this section shall be barred if the
beneficiary is insolvent at the time of the event giving rise to the right to disclaim. Any
voluntary assignment or transfer of, or contract to assign or transfer, an interest in real or
personal property, or written waiver of the right to disclaim the succession to an interest in
real or personal property, by any beneficiary, or any sale or other disposition of an interest
in real or personal property pursuant to judicial process, made before he has filed a disclaimer, as herein provided, bars the right otherwise hereby conferred on such beneficiary
to disclaim as to such interest.
Subd. 7. The right to disclaim granted by this section shall exist irrespective of any
limitation imposed on the interest of the disclaimant in the nature of an express or implied spendthrift provision or similar restriction. A disclaimer, when filed as provided in
this section, or a written waiver of the right to disclaim, shall be binding upon the disclaimant or beneficiary so waiving and all parties thereafter claiming by, through or under
him, except that a beneficiary so waiving may thereafter transfer, assign or release his
interest if such is not prohibited by an express or implied spendthrift provision. If an
interest in real estate is disclaimed and the disclaimer is duly filed in accordance with the
provisions of subdivision 4 of this section, the spouse of the disclaimant, if such spouse has
consented to the disclaimer in writing, shall thereupon be automatically debarred from any
spouse's statutory or common law right or estate by curtesy or in dower or otherwise in
such real estate to which such spouse, except for such disclaimer, would have been entitled.
Subd. 8. This section shall not abridge the right of any person, apart from this section,
under any existing or future statute or rule of law, to disclaim any interest or to assign,
convey, release, renounce or otherwise dispose of any interest.
Subd. 9. Any interest which exists on May 22, 1965 but which has not then become indefeasibly fixed both in quality and quantity, or the taker of which has not then become
finally ascertained, may be disclaimed after May 22, 1965 in the manner provided herein.
APPENDIX B
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §2-801 (1968 vERsiON).
Twelve states have enacted disclaimer statutes modeled after the following proposal of the
1968 version of the U.P.C. See Appendix D infra wherein the states are listed.
Section 2-801. [Renunciation of Succession.]
(a) A person (or his personal representative) who is an heir, devisee, person succeeding
to a renounced interest, beneficiary under a testamentary instrument or person designated
to take pursuant to a power of appointment exercised by a testamentary instrument may
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renounce in whole or in part the succession to any property or interest therein by filing a
written instrument within the time and at the place hereinafter provided. The instrument
shall (i) describe the property or part thereof or interest therein renounced, (ii) be signed
by the person renouncing and (iii) declare the renunciation and the extent thereof.
(b) The writing specified in (a) must be filed within [6] months after the death of the
decedent or the donee of the power, or if the taker of the property is not then finally
ascertained not later than [6] months after the event by which the taker or the interest is
finally ascertained. The writing must be filed in the Court of the county where proceedings concerning the decedent's estate are pending, or where they would be pending if
commenced. A copy of the writing also shall be mailed to the personal representative of
the decedent.
(c) Unless the decedent or donee of the power has otherwise indicated by his will, the
interest renounced, and any future interest which is to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the termination of the interest renounced, passes as if the person renouncing had predeceased the decedent, or if the person renouncing is one designated to
take pursuant to a power of appointment exercised by a testamentary instrument, as if the
person renouncing had predeceased the donee of the power. In every case the renunciation
relates back for all purposes to the date of death of the decedent or the donee, as the case
may be.
(d) Any (1) assignment, conveyance, encumbrance, pledge or transfer of property
therein or any contract therefor, (2) written waiver of the right to renounce or any acceptance of property by an heir, devisee, person succeeding to a renounced interest, beneficiary or person designated to take pursuant to a power of appointment exercised by
testamentary instrument, or (3) sale or other disposition of property pursuant to judicial
process made before the expiration of the period in which he is permitted to renounce, bars
the right to renounce as to the property.
(e) The right to renounce granted by this section exists irrespective of any limitation
on the interest of the person renouncing in the nature of a spendthrift provision or
similar restriction.
() This section does not abridge the right of any person to assign, convey, release, or
renounce any property arising under any other section of this Code or other statute.
(g) Any interest in property which exists on the effective date of this section, but which
has not then become indefeasibly fixed both in quality and quantity, or the taker of which
has not then become finally ascertained, may be renounced after the effective date of this
section as provided herein. An interest which has arisen prior to the effective date of this
section in any person other than the person renouncing is not destroyed or diminished by
any action of the person renouncing taken under this section.
APPENDIX C
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE

§2-801 (1975

VERSION).

Six states have enacted disclaimer statutes modeled after the following amendment to the
1968 U.P.C. §2-801. The amendment is based on the Uniform Disclaimers of Transfers by
Will Intestacy or Appointment Act §§1-6. See Appendix D infra wherein the states are listed.
Section 2-801 [Renunciation of Sucession]
(a) A person or the representative of an incapacitated or protected person, who is an
heir, devisee, person succeeding to a renounced interest, beneficiary under a testamentary
instrument, or appointee under a power of appointment exercised by a testamentary instrument, may renounce in whole or in part the right of succession to any property or
interest therein, including a future interest by filing a written renunciation under this
Section. The right to renounce does not survive the death of the person having it. The
instrument shall (1) describe the property or interest renounced, (2) declare the renunciation and extent thereof, and (3) be signed by the person renouncing.
(b)(1) An instrument renouncing a present interest shall be filed not later than [9]
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months after the death of the decedent or the donee of the power.
(2) An instrument renouncing a future interest may be filed not later than [9] months
after the event determining that the taker of the property or interest is finally ascertained
and his interest is indefeasibly vested.
(3) The renunciation shall be filed in the [probate] court of the county in which proceedings have been commenced for the administration of the estate of the deceased owner
or deceased donee of the power or, if they have not been commenced, in which they could
be commenced. A copy of the renunciation shall be delivered in person or mailed by
registered or certified mail to any personal representative, or other fiduciary of the
decedent or donee of the power. If real property or an interest therein is renounced, a
copy of the renunciation may be recorded in the office of the [Recorder of Deeds] of the

county in which the real estate is situated.
(c) Unless the decedent or donee of the power has otherwise provided, the property or
interest renounced devolves as though the person renouncing had predeceased the decedent or, if the person renouncing is designated to take under a power of appointment

exercised by a testamentary instrument, as though the person renouncing had predeceased
the donee of the power. A future interest that takes effect in possession or enjoyment
after the termination of the estate or interest renounced takes effect as though the person

renouncing had predeceased the decedent or the donee of the power. A renunciation relates back for all purposes to the date of the death of the decedent or the donee of the
power.
(d)(1) The right to renounce property or an interest therein is barred by (i) an assignment, conveyance, encumbrance, pledge, or transfer of the property or interest, or a
contract therefor, (ii) a written waiver of the right to renounce, (iii) an acceptance of the
property or interest or benefit thereunder, or (iv) a sale of the property or interest under
judicial sale made before the renunciation is effected.
(2) The right to renounce exists notwithstanding any limitation on the interest of the
person renouncing in the nature of a spendthrift provision or similar restriction.
(3) A renunciation or a written waiver of the right to renounce is binding upon the
person renouncing or person waiving and all persons claiming through or under him.
(e) This Section does not abridge the right of a person to waive, release, disclaim or renounce property or an interest therein under any other statute.
(f) An interest in property existing on the effective date of this Section as to which the
time for filing a renuncation under this Section would have begun to run were this Section
in effect when the interest was created, may be renounced within [9] months after the
effective date of this Section.
APPENDIX D
STATE DIscLAIMER RuLEsi
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arkansas
Arizona
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois

C.L.2

Minn. §3 UPC 684 UPC 755 Other §

xs
xlo
x11
x12
X1s
x15
x16
xIa
X2o

x2 2

x23
x 25
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y26

Timings

Intestate

Reas.
6 mo.
9 Mo.
6 mo.
9 mo./Reas.14
6 mo.
9 mo.1 7
4 mo./Reas.19
9/6/any2i
6 mo.
15 mo. 24
6 Mo.
9 Mo.

no9
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
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APPENDIX D (Continued)
State
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
Wisconsin
West Virginia
Wyoming

C.L.2

Minn. §3 UPC 684 UPC 755 Other §
X

27

X29

Timingo
3 mo.2 8
6 mo.
9 Mo.
32

x3

3

x 87
39
x
1
x4
x44
x46

X52
54

x
x5 6
X59
x61
x84

xeo
xTI
73

x

X78

x8 0
x8 3
x8 5
x87

6 mo.
4
30 yrs.3
6 mo.36
38
any
9 mo./Reas.40
42
10 mo.
6 Mo.
Rea.
Reas.47
6 mo.49
81
9 mo.
Reas.
Reas.
Reas.
6 Mo.
I yr./Reas.6o
7 mo./6 mo.62
6 Mo.
2 mo./Reas.65
6 mo.
6 mo.68
Reas.0
72
6 Mo.
Reas.
6 Mo.
6 mo.
9 Mo.
Reas.
81
9 mo.
6 Mo.
6 mo./Reas.84
8
6 mo. 6
Reas.

Intestate

7

yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
no4 s

yes
yes
yes
5
no s
55
no
7
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
no7 4

yes
yes
yes
no7 9
yes
yes
yes
yes
88
no

1. Appendix D speaks to local law treatment of disclaimed at-death transfers to the exclusion of inter vivos transfers. Local approaches to disclaimers of inter vivos transfers vary
considerably from state to state; and more importantly, often differ considerably from their
own at-death transfer provisions. Compare FLA. STAT. §689.21 (1977) (inter vivos) with FLA.
STAT. §732.801 (1977) (at-death). Other states, however, have almost identical provisions.
Compare MINN. STAT. §502.211 (inter vivos) with MINN. STAT. §525.532 (at-death).
2. General common law disclaimers: eight states have yet to pass any disclaimer statutes
and therefore are subject to general common law rules for determination of what is a valid
disclaimer. Those states are Alabama, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Nevada, South
Carolina, Vermont, and Wyoming. At common law, disclaimers are available to beneficiaries
under a will. See, e.g., Gottstein v. Hedges, 210 Iowa 272, 228 N.W. 93 (1929). Intestate takers,
however, cannot disclaim their interests because they arise, unlike testate interests, by operation of law. Watson v. Watson, 13 Conn. 83 (1839). Thus, valid federal disclaimers in states
allowing intestate disclaimers and those not allowing intestate disclaimers will differ. See I.R.C.
§2518(b)(4).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1978

23

Florida Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [1978], Art. 6
19781

SECTION 2518 DISCLAIMERS

Although case law has not clearly decided the question, it appears that powers are interests
which may be disclaimed. See Finnell, Disclaimersand the MaritalDeduction, 21 FLA. L. REv.
1, 29 (1968). See I.R.C. §2518(c)(2) which provides that powers may be disclaimed. If a state
court were to hold that a power is not a disclaimable interest, federal disclaimers would be
limited by local law. See I.R.C. §2518(b)(4).
Partial disclaimers are another area of uncertainty. Finnell, supra at 7. See I.R.C. §2518
which does not clearly answer the partial disclaimer question. See text accompanying note 83
supra. Of course, if the local law has a more limited view of what may be disclaimed, subsection 2518(b)(4) will allow state law to limit federal law.
At common law, disclaimers need not have been in writing. Coleman v. Burns, 10S N.H.
813, 171 A.2d 33 (1961). Local law, however, being broader than federal law, will not limit
federal disclaimers, which are required to be in writing. See I.R.C. §§2518(b)(1), (b)(4).
Whether a disclaimer is personal or can be made on behalf of a disclaimant after his death
is unclear. See Finnell, supra at 16. See also I.R.C. §2518(b) which also fails to provide an
answer. See text accompanying note 79 supra. If state law were to hold the right personal and
federal law not, local law would again limit federal law. See I.R.C. §2518(b)(4).
At common law, disclaimers were required to be made within a reasonable time following
transfer, ascertainment or indefeasible vesting. See Keinath v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 57, 62-64
within nine months after transfer.
Apparently at common law, guardians of incompetent beneficiaries or minors could renounce their interests with court permission. See also I.R.C. §2518(b)(2)(B), indicates that the
right to disclaim is personal by extending a minor's disclaimer period to nine months after
his twenty-first birthday. See text accompanying notes 79-80 supra. Federal disclaimers will
again be limited by local law. See I.R.C. §2518(b)(4).
At common law, even insolvent beneficiaries could disclaim interests in spite of objections
by creditors. See Bradford v. Calhoun, 120 Tenn. 53, 109 S.W. 502 (1908). Apparently, this is
the position of §2518 - there being nothing to indicate the contrary in the statute or its
legislative history.
3. MiNN. SrAT. §525.582. See Appendix A supra. The Minnesota disclaimer legislation
was among the first of the modem statutes to be enacted when it was passed in 1965. Although
it does not answer all of the questions left open by the common law, see note 2 supra, it is a
particularly detailed statute. Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Washington have since passed similar
legislation.
Subsection 525.532.1(a) defines "beneficiaries" to include intestate takers, in contrast with
the common law rules. See note 2 supra.
Subsection 525.532.1(b) defines "interests" to include powers, legal interests and fractional
shares. See also both the common law rules and I.R.C. §2518 under which many open questions exist. See note 2 supra and text accompanying note 82 supra. If local law is held to be
narrower than federal law, federal disclaimers will be limited by local law. See I.R.C. §2518

(b)(4).
Subsection 525.532(c) defines "disclaimers" to require a written instrument which is signed,
witnessed and acknowledged by the disclaimant as if it were a real property deed. Notably,
I.R.C. §2518(b)(1) requires only a writing; thus, subsection 525.532-1(c) will effectively limit
federal disclaimers. See I.R.C. §2518(b)(4).
Subsection 525.532.2 provides that a personal representative of a deceased beneficiary may
disclaim that beneficiary's interest. See also the common law rules and I.R.C. §2518, which do
not provide a clear answer. See note 2 supra and text accompanying note 79 supra. Additionally, a minor's interest may be disclaimed by his guardians. See also the common law
rules which allow such disclaimers by permission of the court. See note 2 supra. But see I.R.C.
§2518(b)(2) which apparently does not allow such disclaimers. See text accompanying notes
79-80 supra. The disparity, however, has the effect intended by §2518- federal law limiting
local law.
Subsection 525.532.3 provides that a disclaimer be filed within six months after transfer,
ascertainment or indefeasible vesting, whichever occurs last. See also the common law rule
which provides for a reasonable time period which follows the same three events. See note 2
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supra. But see I.R.C. §2518(b)(2)(A) which provides for a nine month period following only
transfer. Thus the federal timing provision is limited by local law. See I.R.C. §2518(b)(4).
Subsection 525.532A requires that the disclaimer be filed in county court, and also, if it is
real property, with the registrar of titles. The common law rules do not even require a writing. See note 2 supra. And, see also I.R.C. §2518(b) which does not contain such filing requirements. Thus, state law will again limit what is an effective federal disclaimer. See I.R.C.
§2518(b)(4).
Subsection 525.532.5 provides that the disclaimed property passes as if the disclaimant had
predeceased the transferor, unless otherwise indicated in the disclaimant's will. A disclaimant,
however, whose disclaimed interest passes to the residual estate will not be precluded from
taking as a residuary beneficiary. See also I.R.C. §2518(b)(4) which requires disclaimed interests to pass to other than the disclaimant. An interesting Subchapter J question arises in this
context. A beneficiary disclaiming a specific bequest will, under Minnesota law, and presumably under Subchapter J, be the recipient of the residuary estate; however, for estate and
gift tax purposes, the renunciation will not be valid. See M. FERGuSON, J. FREELAND, &
R. STEPHENs, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF ESTATES AND BENEFICIARIES 881-625 (1970) in which
the §668 distinction between specific bequests and general, residuary interests for purposes of
allocating distributable net income is discussed.
Subsection 525.532.6 provides that an insolvent beneficiary cannot disclaim an interest.
See also common law rules and I.R.C. §2518 which make no such distinction. See note 2 supra.
Thus, once again, local law will limit federal disclaimers. See I.R.C. §2518(b)(4).
4. UPC §2-801 (1968 version). See Appendix B supra. The 1968 UPC disclaimer statute is
the model for eleven states: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Montana,
Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Texas. It is not as detailed as the Minnesota
statute, however. See note 3 supra. Thus, much more of the common law remains applicable
in these eleven states than in those states with such detailed statutes as Minnesota.
Subsection 2-801(a) provides for disclaimers of intestate shares. See also the common law
rules. See note 2 supra. Thus, pursuant to I.R.C. §2518(b)(4), federal disclaimers will not be
uniform. Additionally, interests may be renounced in "whole or in part." See also the common
law rules, the uncertainties of which remain unanswered by this statute. See note 2 supra.
And, see also I.R.C. §2518 which also leaves open many questions. See text accompanying note
83 supra. Finally, subsection 2-801(a) lists the contents of a valid disclaimer, required to be in
writing, as follows: (i) description of the interest; (ii) a declaration of the disclaimer and its
intent; (iii) a declaration of the disclaimer and its extent. The common law rules do not even
require a writing. See note 2 supra. See also I.R.C. §2518(b) which does require a writing but
does not specify its contents. Thus, local law will limit federal disclaimers. See I.R.C. §2518
(b)(4).
Subsection 2-801(b) provides that disclaimers must be filed before six months after the
transfer or, if later, six months after the taker of the interest has been ascertained. See also
common law rules which provide for disclaimers within a reasonable time following transfer,
ascertainment or indefeasible vesting. See note 2 supra. See also I.R.C. §2518(b)(2)(A)
which requires disclaimers be made within nine months of transfer without qualification.
Thus, although sometimes broader, see Keinath v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1973),
state law will limit federal disclaimers to those made within six months of transfer in most
instances. See I.R.C. §2518(b)(4). Additionally, subsection 2-801(b) requires the disclaimer be
filed in county court. See also I.R.C. §2518(b) wherein no such filing requirement is found.
Thus, state law will limit federal disclaimers. See I.R.C. §2518(b)(4).
Subsection 2-801(c) provides that the disclaimed property passes as if the disclaimant had
predeceased the transferor, unless otherwise indicated in the transferor's will. See also I.R.C.
§2518(b)(4) which requires disclaimed interests to pass to other than the disclaimant. See note
3 supra discussing a Subchapter J problem with this requirement.
5. UPC §2-801 (1975 version); see Appendix C supra. The 1975 UPC reflects the suggested
modifications made by the UNIFORM DIsCLAIMER or TRANSFERS BY WILL, INTESTACY, OR APPOINTMENT AcT. The newer UPC disclaimer statute is the model for six states: Illinois, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maine, Oregon and Utah. Only the relatively few changes from the previous UPC

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1978

25

Florida Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [1978], Art. 6

1978]

SECTION 2518 DISCLAIMERS

are spoken to below. For the remainder of questions arising under the 1975 version, see notes
2 (common law) and 5 (1968 UPC) supra.
Subsection 2-801(a) provides for minor's rights to disclaim by placing the right in the representative of incapacitated persons. See also the common law rules under which the answer

is unclear. See note 2 supra. See also I.R.C. §2518(b)(1)(B) which apparently does not allow
such disclaimers. See text accompanying notes 79-80 supra. Additionally, subsection 2-801(a)
provides that the right to disclaim does not survive the disclaimant. See also the common

law rules and I.R.C. §2518(b)(2), under which the issue is unclear. See note 2 supra and text
accompanying note 79 supra.

Subsection 2-801(b)(1)(2) provides for a disclaimer period of nine months following the
later of transfer, ascertainment or indefeasible vesting. See also the common law rules which
provide for disclaimers within a reasonable time following the later of those three commence-

ment dates. See note 2 supra. I.R.C. §2518(b)(2)(A) provides for a nine month period following
only transfer. The disparity, however, has the effect intended by §2518 -federal law
limiting local law.
Subsection 2-801(b)(3) provides that valid disclosures must be filed with the office of the

registrar of the county in which any real property is located, if real property is being disclaimed. Common law rules do not require a filing; I.R.C. §2518(b)(2) requires filing only
with the decedent's legal representative. Thus, local law again limits federal disclaimers. See
I.R.C. §2518(b)(4).
6. See notes 60-69, 106-131 supra and accompanying text discussing the timing issue and
recommending legislative amendment to §2518(b)(2)(A), (b)(4).
7. Federal disclaimers are dependent on the validity of the disclaimer under local law.
See I.R.C. §2518(b)(4). Thus, whether state law allows disclaimeis of intestate interests remains

a significant question.
8. See First Nat'l Bank of Montgomery v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 768 (M.D. Ala.
1959), afjd per curiam, 285 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1961), in which a disclaimer of a devise was
allowed within a reasonable time after transfer under Alabama law.
9. Although no case deciding the question under Alabama law was discovered, all other
states which have decided the question have held that intestate shares arise by operation of
law and therefore cannot be disclaimed under common law. See, e.g., Watson v. Watson, 13
Conn. 83 (1839).
10. ALASKA STAT. §13.11.295 (1973).
11. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§62.3201-.3212 (Supp. 1973). See Eiseman & Mathis, Estate Planning
with Disclaimersin Arkansas, 27 ARK. L. REv. 411 (1973).
12. ARiZ. Rnv. STAT. §14.2801 (1975).
See Effiland, Estate Planning under the New Arizona Probate Code, I Asuz. STATE L.J. 1

(1974).
13.

CAL. PROB. CODE §§190.01.10 (West 19V2) which provides for disclaimers of inter vivos,
as well as at-death, transfers.
See Allen & Lawson, Estate Planning with Disclaimers in California, 52 Los ANGELES B.J.
162 (1976).
14. CAL. PROB. CODE §190.03 (West 1972) which provides that an effective disclaimer must
be made within a reasonable time after the disclaimant is made aware of his interest. A nine
month period after the later of death or indefeasible vesting, however, presumptively is a
reasonable time subject to discaimant's proof to the contrary. See also the suggested amendment to §2518(b)(2)(A) discussed in notes 96-131 supra and accompanying text.
15. CLO. REv. STAT. § 15-11-801 (1973).
16. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§45.299.312(a) (West 1958).
See Birell, Legal and Tax Consequences of Powers of Appointment in Connecticut, 50
48
CONN. BAR J.
1 (1976).

17.

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

§45.307 (West 1958) which provides that disclaimers must be

made within nine months after transfer, ascertainment or indefeasible vesting.
18. DEL. CODE tit. 12, §512 (1974). This statute leaves many questions unanswered; thus,
common law rules should govern.
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19. Id. §512(b). This provides that disclaimers must be made within one hundred and
twenty days after death, subject to extension within the discretion of the Court of Chancery.
20. FLA. STAT. §732.801 (1977).
21. FIA. STAT. §732.801(5) (1977) provides the single most confused local law timing
standard. Generally, an interest may be disclaimed within nine months after transfer; however.
if the transferee is not ascertained or the interest not fully vested, the disclaimer can be made
within six months of those events. And finally, if all interested parties agree, renunciation
can occur at any time. Query, whether the Federal Government is an interested party where
the marital deduction is increased by a disclaimer.
22. GA. CODE ANN. §113.824 (1977).
23. HAW. REV. STAT. §§538.1-.3 (1973) (based on the UNIFORM DISCLAiMER OF PROPERTY
INTatsr Acr §§1-11). Except for providing for disclaimers of both inter vivos and at-death
transfers, it is essentially the same as the 1975 UPC. But see note 24 infra.
24. HAw. REv. STAT. §538.1 (1973) changes the UPC timing period from six to fifteen
months.
25. IDAHO CODE §15-2-801 (1976).
26. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 7, §2 (1970).
27. IND. CODE §29-1-64 (1971) provides only for renunciation of "all or any portion of
real or personal property." Whether this statute replaces common law notions, such as renunciation of powers to appoint, or is in addition to the common law is not dear. Additionally, no renunciation is valid if objected to by a prejudiced creditor of a disclaimant
within thirty days. Presumably, no such limit exists under §2518. See note 2 supra. Thus,
Indiana state law will limit federal disclaimers. See I.R.C. §2518(b)(4).
28. IND. CODE §29-1-64 (1971) which provides that renunciations must be made within
three months after the appointment of the personal representative.
29. IowA CODE §633.704 (1971).
30. KAN. STAT. §§59.2290-.2293 (Supp. 1977).
See Moore, Estate Tax Note: Disclaimer,42 KAN. STATE B.J. 167 (1973).
31. Ky. REv. STAT. §§394.610-.680 (1970).
32. KY. REV. STAT. §394.620(l)-.620(2) (1970). This provision deviates from the UPC by
implementing a six month time standard, instead of the suggested nine month standard.
33. LA. REv. STAT. §977 (West 1970) leaves many questions unanswered. However, case
law interpreting the Louisiana disclaimer statute is extensive.
34. Tillery v. Fuller, 190 La. 586, 182 So. 683 (1938), wherein an heir who did not accept
any benefits from succession was held to have thirty years in which to disclaim.
35. ME. REv. STAT. tit. 18, §§1251-54 (Supp. 1977).
36. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18, §1253(1) (Supp. 1977), deviates from the UPC by implementing
a six month time standard, rather than the suggested nine month standard.
37. MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, §9-101 (1957). This section leaves many questions unanswered;
thus, common law rules should govern.
38. Official Comment, MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, §9-101 (1957), which declares any time until
acceptance to be the preferred time limit. The statute itself does not speak to the timing issue.
39. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 191A, §§I-10 (West 1978). This statute, the Minnesota
statute set out in Appendix A, supra, is quite comprehensive.
40. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 191A, §3 (West 1978), provides that disclaimers must be
made within nine months after death, subject to extension within the discretion of a state
court.
41, MICH. CoMp. LAws ANN. §§554.501-.517 (Supp. 1968-1976). This is another comprehensive statute similar to the Minnesota statute, Appendix A, supra.
42. MICH. CoMe. LAws ANN. §554.502 (Supp. 1968-1976) provides that a disclaimer must
be made within ten months after transfer, ascertainment or indefeasible vesting.
43. MINN. STAT. §525.532 (1976).
44. See Greely v. Houston, 148 Miss. 759, 114 So. 740 (1927), wherein the right to renounce at common law was recognized.
45. See note 9 supra.
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46. Mo. REV. STAT. §474.490 (1969) provides only for renunciation of real and personal
property. See note 27 supra, discussing the open questions under such a provision. Since it is
a relatively incomplete statute, most questions should be answered by common law rules.
47. Sanders v. Jones, 347 Mo. 255, 147 S.V.2d 424 (1941).
48. MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §91A.2.801 (Supp. 1977).
49. MoNT. REV. COpas ANN. §91A.2.801(2) (Supp. 1977), which implements a six month
time standard, instead of the nine month standard suggested by the UPC.
50. NEB. REV. STAT. §30-2352 (1977).
See James, Taxation: Disclaimer or Renunciation Under Nebraska Statutes, 55 Nm. L.
REv. 464 (1976).
51. NED. REv. STAT. §80-2352(a)(2) (1977) also implements a nine rather than six month
standard.
52. No statute or case was found which spoke to the question of disclaimers. See note 2
supra for a discussion of the common law rules which should govern.
53. See note 9 supra.
54. See Bradley v. State, 100 N.H. 232, 123 A.2d 148 (1956) in which the court recognized
the common law right to disclaim, but held that it did not apply to intestate interests.
55. 100 N.H. at 236, 123 A.2d at 151.
56. See Lawes v. Lynch, 7 N.J. Supp. 584, 72 A.2d 414 (1950), wherein the court recognized
the common law right to disclaim a devise within a reasonable time after the testator's death.
57. See note 9 supra.

58. N.M. STAT.

ANN.

§32A-2-801 (1953).

59. 1977 N.Y. LAws ch. 861, §§1-4 which, like the Minnesota statute, see Appendix A
supra,is quite comprehensive.
60. 1977 N.Y. LAws ch. 861, §2-1.11(b) provides that disclaimers must be made within one
year following the date of disposition, subject to extension within the discretion of a state
court.

61. N.C. GEN.

STAT.

§§31B.1-.7 (1976).

62. N.C. GEN. STAT. §31B.2 (1976) provides that disclaimers of present interests must be
made within seven months after death. Additionally, a six month period following ascertainment and indefeasible vesting is provided for future interests.
63. NJ). CENT. CODE §30.1-10-01 (1976).
64. OHIo Rnv. CODE ANN. §2105.061 (Page 1976) provides for renunciation of intestate
shares; the common law rules should govern other questions.
65. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §2105.061 (Page 1976) provides that intestate disclaimers must
be made within sixty days after notice of an inventory hearing. Apparently, a devisee may disclaim his interest under common law rules. Wallace v. McMicken, 4 Gay. 165 (1876).
66. OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, §§22-27 (West 1970).
See Comment, Estate and Gift Taxes: Oklahoma's New Disclaimer Statute, 27 OKLA. L.
REv. 62 (1974).
67. OR. Rv. STAT. §§112.650-.677 (1977).
68. OR. Ry. STAT. §112.655 (1977) differs from the UPC by utilizing a six month time
standard, instead of the formers nine month standard.
69. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §6103 (Purdon 1975).
70. Since there is no time limit provided by statute, it is dear that common law rules
should govern. Thus, the disclaimer period will be provided by the reasonable time standard.
See Keinath v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1973).
71. R.I. GEN. LAws §§34.5.1-.5.12 (1956).
72. R.I GEN. LAws §§34.5.1-.5.9 (1956), each of which provide six month time limits for
different interests or disclaimants beginning at appropriate times. E.g., R.I. GEN. LAws §34.5.9
provides that disclaimers by disabled parties can be made until six months after the disability
is removed.
73. No statute or case was found which spoke to the question of disclaimers. See note 2
supra discussing the common law rules which should govern.
74. See note 9 supra.
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